UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FILED EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK CLERK

JGK 08/18/2017
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
LONG ISLAND OFFICE

PLAINTIFFS 1-21,

: 15-CV-2431 (ADS) (GRB)

Plaintiff, :

: June 30, 2017

v. : Central Islip

: Central Islip, NY

COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, et al., :

:

Defendant. :

TRANSCRIPT OF CIVIL CAUSE FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND RULING
BEFORE THE HONORABLE GARY R. BROWN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff: MALLORY BRENNAN, ESQ.

For the Defendant: ADRIANA LOPEZ, ESQ.

SCOTT GREENE, PRO SE

Audio Operator:

Court Transcriber: ARIA SERVICES, INC.

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Carmel, NY 10512 (845) 260-1377

Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording, transcript produced by transcription service

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THE CLERK: Calling case 15-CV-2431,
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    Plaintiffs 1-21 v. County of Suffolk, et al.
               Counsel, please state your appearance for
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    the record.
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               MS. BRENNAN: Good morning. This is Mallory
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    Brennan from Shearman & Sterling, on behalf of
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    plaintiffs 1 through 21.
               THE COURT: Would you like to introduce
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    anyone else who's here on your behalf?
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               MS. BRENNAN: I would be delighted to.
               THE COURT: Go ahead.
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               MS. BRENNAN: This is my colleague, James
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    Alicia (ph), also from Shearman & Sterling.
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               THE COURT: Welcome back. Go ahead.
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               MS. BRENNAN: And Joanna Cuevas Ingram, who
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    joins us from Latino Justice, also on behalf of the
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    plaintiffs.
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               THE COURT: Excellent. Thank you for
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    coming.
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               Counsel?
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               MS. LOPEZ: Good morning, your Honor.
    name is Adriana Lopez. I'm here on behalf of Suffolk
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    County and i8 represent the Suffolk County defendants,
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    not Mr. Greene.
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               THE COURT: Ms. Lopez, good to see you
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    again.
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               MS. LOPEZ:
                           Thank you, Judge.
               THE COURT:
                           Mr. Greene, are you on the phone
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    with us this morning?
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               MR. GREENE:
                           Yes, sir, I am.
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               THE COURT: Very good. I will note your
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    presence.
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               Ms. Lopez, thank you for arranging that.
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               MS. LOPEZ:
                           No problem, your Honor.
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                           This is on for a status
               THE COURT:
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    conference. The main issue I would like to deal with
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    today would be the application by plaintiffs concerning
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    the protective order on the immigration issue.
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               Would you like to be heard on that?
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               MS. BRENNAN:
                             I would, thank you. I'm
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    prepared to go ahead if the Court is.
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               THE COURT: Please.
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               MS. BRENNAN: May it please the Court.
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    Again, Mallory Brennan from Shearman & Sterling on
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    behalf of plaintiffs.
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               The relief that plaintiffs seek in the
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    motion for a protective order is narrow but it is
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    extremely important. The purpose of the motion is to
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    prevent plaintiffs from being questioned during
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    depositions about matters that go directly to
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immigration status. There are three reasons that the Court should grant the motion today. First, as I mentioned, the scope of the relief that's requested is in fact quite narrow. There are only four specific categories of inquiry that we believe should be precluded from discovery. THE COURT: Okay, go ahead. MS. BRENNAN: Second, these inquiries are irrelevant to any material claim or defense in this case. Plaintiffs are pursuing claims for violation of their constitutional and civil rights based on racial and ethnic discrimination, not based on their immigration status. Finally, the substantial chilling effect that is widely recognized, caused by inquiries into immigration status, far outweighs whatever value questions about plaintiffs' status might yield. With respect to the specific categories, I think it's important that we be clear about what plaintiffs are requesting and what we are not requesting. There are four specific categories as to which we believe discovery should be precluded. First, questions that go directly to immigration status. So questions such as, are you concerned about your immigration status, or, do you have a green card, should not be permitted.

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Second, questions that are directed to separate immigration proceedings such as an application for an adjustment of status.

Third, questions that are directed to a plaintiff's or witness' entry into the United States, so when did you come, how long have you been here, how did you enter the country, how many times have you been in the United States.

Then finally, questions concerning Social Security numbers, tax i.d. numbers or employment authorization.

All four of those categories go directly to immigration status. That are the types of inquiries that courts in this district and elsewhere routinely prohibit. I just want to be quite clear that in defendants' opposition, there was the suggestion that plaintiffs are seeking to prohibit discovery from any matter that might touch on immigration in any way, and that that would be a limiting factor to defendants in pursuing their claims, and that is not the scope of relief that plaintiffs are seeking here.

THE COURT: I can't say I would blame counsel if the precise contours were not that clear because the iterative process by which this developed does leave some questions. Before I let you walk away

from that point --1 2 MS. BRENNAN: Certainly. THE COURT: Your fourth category, Social 3 Security numbers, employment authorizations, do you 4 5 consider motor vehicle licenses in the same category? 6 MS. BRENNAN: No, we don't. We consider 7 that to be distinct. So, too, for example with vehicle registration. I believe that the defendants had 9 suggested that plaintiffs were seeking to preclude 10 testimony about names that plaintiffs may have used. 11 It's common in the Latino community for individuals to have multiple names as opposed to just the two or three 12 13 that might be common outside of that community, and 14 plaintiffs aren't seeking to prohibit any of that 15 discovery. In fact, though I appreciate that the Court 16 does not have the full record from the depositions that 17 have taken place to date in this case. 18 Defendants' counsel, however, was present 19 and the only questions where plaintiffs were instructed 20 not to answer are questions that fall into the 21 categories that I've articulated here. So this is not 22 -- we're not trying to make it impossible for 2.3 defendants to prove their case. We're just trying to 2.4 get an appropriate degree of protection so that 25 plaintiffs are comfortable pursuing their

constitutional rights. 1 2 If there are no further questions with respect to the categories, I'll turn to my second 3 point, which concerns the irrelevance of immigration 4 5 status to the claims and defenses in the case. As I 6 explained and as is apparent on the face of the complaint, plaintiffs are pursuing claims for discriminatory police practices based on their ethnic 9 heritage, based on their race, not based on immigration 10 status. 11 Simply put, there's just no way that you can 12 look at a person, whether they're of Latino heritage or 13 any other ethnic background, and evaluate whether they 14 are American citizens, whether they're in this country 15 illegally. You can't know that on site. So 16 plaintiffs' allegations here are directed to -- if you 17 look in the complaint, for example, nearly fifty times, 18 we allege that Suffolk County Latinos have been targets 19 of discriminatory police practice, and I quote, "solely 20 because they are Latino." 21 Indeed, the only allegations in the 22 complaint that anywhere mention undocumented status or 23 immigration status concern the defendants' own 2.4 perceptions and racial profiling based on assumptions 25 which we contend derive from plaintiffs' Latino

1 heritage. So to the extent that there is any discovery 2 that is even worthwhile touching on immigration status, it should be with respect to defendants' own 3 perspectives and beliefs, not with respect to whether 4 5 or not plaintiffs are undocumented. 6 I'd like to touch briefly on the defenses 7 that defendants contend they will be limited from 8 pursuing if the Court grants plaintiffs' motion. 9 First, the Suffolk County defendants contend that they 10 will seek to establish that defendant Greene was a 11 roque actor and that he was targeting plaintiffs 12 because he believed that Latino motorists were more 13 likely to be undocumented, unlicensed, and therefore 14 unlikely to file complaints with the Suffolk County 15 Police Department about his conduct. Again, that goes 16 to defendant Greene's own beliefs and perceptions, not 17 whether plaintiffs are or are not undocumented. 18 With respect to defendants' contention that 19 they shouldn't be -- that the Suffolk County defendants 20 couldn't possibly be expected to investigate crimes or 21 concerns that weren't reported to them, that simply 22 misconstrues the complaint in this case. We're not 23 alleging that they should have been clairvoyant, we're 2.4 alleging that they should have had better systems in 25 place to monitor and that they failed to investigate

1 claims that were actually reported. 2 In any event, that issue is something of a side show because plaintiffs, when questioned about 3 whether they were afraid to report their experiences 4 5 with defendant Greene or other of the John doe 6 defendants, have answered that question. So we're not seeking to preclude the county from inquiring about whether defendants were afraid, only from going so far 9 as to inquire as to immigration status. 10 Finally, defendants make the point in their 11 opposition a couple of times that they should be able to inquire into immigration status because it goes to 12 13 plaintiffs' credibility. That is simply not sufficient 14 justification for discovery into immigration status. 15 THE COURT: You had me at hello on that 16 particular argument. 17 MS. BRENNAN: All right. I will move on 18 then. I'll move on to my final point, which is that 19 the substantial effect of inquiries into immigration 20 status far and away outweighs whatever probative value 21 defendants think that they might gain from making 22 inquiries into that subject matter. 23 Magistrate Judge Pollack in the Eastern 2.4 District put it this way in Wejaja v. King UUSA (ph).

She recognized that as a starting point, discovery into

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immigration status is not normally available. This is because the fear and intimidation that's created by having to answer questions about immigration status is a real issue. It's a real concern. The Ninth Circuit put it this way in <u>Rivera v. Nib</u>co (ph). If discovery into immigration status was permitted in every civil rights case that asserts claims based on race discrimination or ethnic heritage, there would be broad swaths of viable actions that would never be brought because of the intimidation effect, and that's the balance that plaintiffs ask this Court to find falls in favor of them. To conclude, your Honor, given that the scope of the protection that the plaintiffs seek is limited and the significant impact and intimidation that these kinds of inquiries into immigration status has on the plaintiffs, we request that the Court grant the motion. I'd be happy to answer any questions that you might have. THE COURT: I have a few. MS. BRENNAN: Please. THE COURT: It should be noted that I think the world of Judge Pollack, so I always pay attention when someone cites her to me. What kind of case was that, do you know?

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               MS. BRENNAN: The Wejaja case I believe was
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    a Fair Labor Standards Act case.
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               THE COURT:
                           Okay.
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               MS. BRENNAN:
                             I would note that with respect
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    to that -- I believe that defendants suggested that
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    that's a different kind of case and that for some
    reason, the standards wouldn't apply, but that's simply
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    not the case.
                   The Southern District of New York
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    addressed that very question in the case Tapa v. Deer
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    (ph). There, the court explained that the key question
    is one of relevance. It's not whether it's a Fair
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    Labor Standards Act case or it's an Alien Tort Claims
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    Act case, it's a matter of relevance.
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               THE COURT: So the one argument that the
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    County made that I didn't hear you address was the
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    notion that there could be sub-classes, given that you
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    have a class action here, that the impact of the
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    complained-of conduct could affect citizens,
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    naturalized citizens, lawful permanent residents, those
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    with work authorizations and those without differently.
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    What about that?
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               In other words, doesn't the County have the
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    right to know sort of what they're facing in the trial
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    here? In other words, don't they have the right to
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    know if there are different groups for whom different
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relief might be called for, or for some groups that might not be classes, in other words that may not qualify as a class because they're not numerous? they have that right and how do we address that if we don't do it this way? MS. BRENNAN: I think the answer to that question is pretty straightforward. The plaintiffs in this case are suing on behalf of Latino residents in Suffolk County. As I mentioned before, there's no way you can look at a person who you might perceive to be of Latino heritage and evaluate whether that person is documented, undocumented, a naturalized citizen, in the process of becoming naturalized. Those are really distinctions without a difference for purposes of these claims, because the source of the discrimination doesn't have anything to do with immigration status. So without getting too far into details about whether all plaintiffs and witnesses in this case are documented or undocumented, it doesn't really make a difference. That's not a basis to distinguish among the class. I think to the extent that -- I would note that defendants don't really explain why it would make a difference. There's nothing in the complaint --

THE COURT: I will agree with you that I

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don't think it was articulated but I think I can
explain why. In your complaint, and I cite to page 61
of the complaint, you seek U visa authorization or U
visa certifications for what must be by definition some
plaintiffs. In other words, you're looking for
specific immigration relief. Doesn't that fact
distinguish this case from any of the cases you've
cited to me? I couldn't find another case where
immigration relief was sought as part of the complaint
and yet plaintiffs' counsel said, immigration status is
irrelevant and prejudicial and you can't inquire into
it. How can I reconcile those two concepts, counsel?
          MS. BRENNAN:
                         I think the answer to that
question is that to the extent there are plaintiffs for
whom U visa applications have not already been
completed, that that is the kind of relief that can be
addressed separately and wouldn't necessarily be sought
on behalf of the entire class because to your point --
           THE COURT:
                      Right.
          MS. BRENNAN: -- it's not the kind of thing
that lends itself to class-wide relief. I think it's
the same with respect to remuneration for monies that
were taken from certain of the plaintiffs by defendant
         That, too, is not necessarily the kind of
relief that would be on a class-wide basis because, for
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example, those who have experienced discrimination
through targeted checkpoints that were designed to
target Latino communities or by the failure to
investigate complaints lodged by Latinos, they're not
going to be participating in the efforts to recover
funds.
           THE COURT:
                       I would still point out to you
that if the U visa relief remains, at some point, the
question must be asked regarding anonymous plaintiffs 1
through 21, please raise your hand if you'd like a U
visa. That's the same as asking them if they're
documented or not, is it not?
           MS. BRENNAN: Not in the context of a
deposition, your Honor.
           THE COURT: No, but at some point --
           MS. BRENNAN: Yes.
                               At some point, to the
extent there are named plaintiffs who have not yet had
the opportunity to apply for a U visa application,
which in fairness concerned the separate criminal
proceeding that was brought against defendant Greene.
And to the extent that at the conclusion of the case,
there are additional plaintiffs who have not yet made
that application, then there would need to be a process
through which they could do so, but we think that that
can be addressed separately.
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THE COURT: So really your argument then is
not that substantively, this question can never be
asked. You're just arguing when and where and how it
                 Is that fair?
should be asked.
          MS. BRENNAN: Yeah, I think that's a fair
distinction.
           THE COURT:
                      Okay.
          MS. BRENNAN: If we get to the point where
liability is found and it becomes appropriate for a U
visa application to be submitted, I think that we can
take it up then.
           THE COURT: Okay, but then we have to take
one more step. And when you represent to me here --
you're arguing -- you're doing a fine job, counsel, and
I'm not criticizing you. And it's a big case and
there's a lot of paper and you've got to go through a
lot of things. But when you say to me, Judge, we're
just about people who, I think the argument is looked
or appeared to be Latino and how they were treated,
which actually raises an interesting question about
somebody who is actually not Latino but appears to be,
but that's a question for another day and far above my
pay grade, so I'm glad to say we're not going to talk
about that today.
           But when you say that the allegations don't
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have anything to do with status, it makes me look at the complaint, and I will give you one example, and there are many. Paragraph 141: You say, upon information and belief, the 2007 directive -- I know you all know what that means -- the directive to arrest all unlicensed drivers has led to the racial profiling of undocumented Latino immigrants driving on Suffolk County roads. It's part of your story. It's part of the allegations you made that the licensing val non of individuals led to a discriminatory practice as against undocumented Latinos. With that in mind, how can I deny the County to make some kind of inquiry in that area? I think paragraph 141 is a MS. BRENNAN: good example of where it is the defendants' intent, it's the County's intent and their perception and their understanding and their apparent belief that Latino motorists are more likely to be undocumented immigrants than a perceived non-Latino motorist. That's what's relevant in paragraph 141. I think the other thing to bear in mind is that even there is some marginal degree of relevance as to documented versus undocumented status, that is not material to plaintiffs' claims or defendants' defenses in this case. It's a collateral issue at best and the

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case is clear -- notably, defendants cite nothing to
the contrary -- that even if there is some degree of
relevance of immigration status to collateral issues in
the case, that does not outweigh the chilling effect
that those kinds of inquiries have on plaintiffs who
are trying to defend their constitutional rights.
           THE COURT: Okay, good, thank you.
           MS. BRENNAN:
                         Thank you.
           THE COURT: Ms. Lopez, the ball is in your
court.
          MS. LOPEZ:
                       Thank you, your Honor.
                                               Ι
respectfully disagree with plaintiffs' counsel.
think immigration is material in this case. As the
Court indicated, there are various paragraphs in the
complaint that specifically indicate that -- they talk
about undocumented immigrants living in Suffolk County.
           In our letter, we cited to paragraph 78 of
the complaint, which pretty much says, in my own words,
that former Sergeant Greene and others from the Suffolk
County Police Department had a policy and practice in
place where they would target undocumented immigrants,
Latinos specifically, because they were under the
belief that they would be vulnerable, they will not go
to law enforcement, they wouldn't report the crime,
they were an easy target and, therefore, it was an easy
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way to steal money from them. They didn't say that it was only Greene. They mentioned the police department in general, your Honor.

Based on that, I do again state that immigration is material in this case. It's not just a collateral matter and the County shouldn't be precluded from asking those questions because I think they go to our defense, which is, the County doesn't have a policy that discriminated against Latinos and to rob and steal from them, it was Mr. Greene, the one who had this scheme going on. He knew who he was targeting, he knew where he was going, he knew who he could go get and he knew who was not going to say anything to the police department because he was their own. Who were they going to believe, the victim, who is here undocumented, against a fellow police officer who was doing this?

No, he knew what he was doing.

So yes, we should be entitled to ask those questions based on that. However, Judge, the one thing that I find interesting in this case is that counsel has said that we shouldn't be asking about, do you have a green card, when did you enter the United States, how did you enter the United States, do you have a Social Security number? Those questions really haven't been asked during the depositions, your Honor. The way that

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we have been asking questions is more about background. We asked about, how long have you been in the United Why? Because we want to set a time frame as to when they have been residing in Suffolk County. Perhaps we should have started by, how long have you been a Suffolk County resident, and then, have you lived in any other counties, have you lived in any other states? And we have done that. Then we go to the question as to, how long have you been in the U.S.? Why? Because we want to establish a time frame. You've been here for fifteen years? Great. Did you come to New York State from the start or were you living in other places? The reason why we were asking those questions is because in some of these cases when they have been pulled over, the vehicles have been registered in Texas, they have been registered in Virginia. There's connections to other states. Therefore, we want to know, one, have you ever been in Texas or Arizona, whatever other state you have ever been to, and how long? And if you have, have you ever had any encounters with law enforcement? Why? Because we want to know if they have been pulled over, if they have been issued traffic violations and things of that sort, which again relates to the complaint. They're

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saying that every time they have been pulled over in Suffolk County is because they are Latino, they have been targeted and there was no basis for the stop. Those have been our questions, your Honor. I do admit that we did ask about the status of their U visa application. The reason why we asked those questions is because during discovery, they gave us not the U visa application that was submitted. only gave us the certification that was signed by the law enforcement, by Suffolk County or the ADA who prosecuted the case. Based on the fact that they produced that, they gave it to us, we asked, what's the status? Now the Court might ask, why do you ask about the status of the U visa application? Because it lends to -- when you get a U visa approved, you get a Social Security number and you get employment authorization, which connects to what the Court asked, what about the driver's license issue? Because if you have a Social Security number, you will be able to get a driver's license. If you have a driver's license, then you shouldn't be getting tickets for operating a vehicle without a license. So there is a connection to the questions that we have asked, Judge.

We have not been intimidating, we have not

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been harassing, we have not at any point in time asked, have you ever been deported, have you ever been placed in immigration proceedings? Have you ever been arrested by ICE, did you cross the border, was it through a visa, did you fly in, did you cross the river, have you ever been -- did you pay a sponsor to come in? Those questions haven't been asked. Perhaps we could be able to ask those questions but we haven't because we don't need that at this point. For them to say that we cannot ask about -- preclude us completely from asking any background information is just not correct. We should be entitled to present our defense. I wanted to address also about the fact -- I wanted to make another point, Judge. I think in probably two of the depositions, we haven't even asked the plaintiffs, where were you born, which I think we shouldn't be precluded from asking that question, either. I mean at the end of the day, they are claiming that they're Latinos. And yes, you can be Latino and born in the United States or like me. born in Colombia and I'm a U.S. citizen, but yet we should be entitled to ask those basic questions because they do have to prove that they're Latinos and they So again, our depositions haven't been aggressive. We have not been intimidating the

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plaintiffs. We just have been asking the questions that I think needed to be asked in order to set forth our defense.

As far as the sub-classes that the Court touched upon, and it was one of the points that we're bringing is that they want to certify a class of all Suffolk County residents that are Latinos who somehow may or perhaps in the future may be discriminated against by the police department. Our argument is that that definition as is is over-broad because this case at this point has only established that the people that Greene was targeting were those people who were vulnerable and didn't have documents in the United States.

If that is the case, I'm part of the class, Judge. I'm a Suffolk County resident, always have been, and I'm Latina, and I have never had an interaction with the police department. So we should be entitled to ask those questions.

THE COURT: That touches on an interesting topic. I'm going to throw one more question your way and then I want to hear from Mr. Greene if he has anything to add. I mentioned earlier that there could be people in the world that may be notified here who appear to be Latino but are not, in other words born in

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the Ukraine, the family has been in the Ukraine for a
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    thousand years but happens to appear to be Latino.
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    mentioned the question before about whether that person
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    could be a class member and I don't know the answer.
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    But assuming the answer is no, isn't that another basis
    for inquiring as to the sort of bona fides of whether a
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    particular plaintiff is in fact Latino or identifies as
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    Latino, and aren't all these questions relevant to
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    that?
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               MS. BRENNAN: I think the answer to your
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    first question is yes and to your second question is --
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               THE COURT:
                           Meaning that if I'm born in the
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    Ukraine, I still can qualify as a the plaintiff?
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               MS. BRENNAN: No, I had forgotten about that
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    question.
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               THE COURT:
                           Sorry.
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               MS. BRENNAN: The class is limited to those
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    of Latino heritage who are resident in Suffolk County.
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               THE COURT: How do we know then?
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               MS. BRENNAN: I think -- none of the
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    questions that we're seeking to preclude go to self-
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    identification of race, go to the origin, ethnicity,
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    country of origin. That's not on the list of questions
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    that we're seeking to preclude. We have given no
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    instructions in depositions. To the extent that
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defendants have asked questions about country of
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    origin, we haven't told our clients not to answer those
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    questions. So there's something of a red herring
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            That's nothing that we're trying to preclude
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    from discovery here.
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               THE COURT: So to be clear, if Ms. Lopez
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    asked the question, where were you born, you were fine
    with that?
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               MS. BRENNAN: We recognize under the
    circumstances of the nature of the class on whose
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    behalf we are suing that that is a relevant inquiry.
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    will say that there are distinctions that are drawn
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    between race/national origin.
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               THE COURT: Sure.
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               MS. BRENNAN: But without getting into the
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    finer points of those issues, that question is not on
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    the list of questions that we're seeking to preclude.
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               The other thing that I would add is that Ms.
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    Lopez's colloquy about driver's license and states of
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    registration and different plates and all of that
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    information, again, those questions are not on the list
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    of topics that we're seeking to preclude here, so
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    there's simply no basis for defendants' position that
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    plaintiff's motion would somehow impact their ability
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    to discover that information. If they'd like to ask
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how long a witness has been resident in Suffolk County,
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    they're welcome to do so. We're not instructing our
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    clients not to answer those questions. The scope of
    relief that we're seeking here is very limited.
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               The last point that I would just add on that
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    note is that defendants have asked at least one witness
    -- let me get the direct quote -- "you currently do not
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    have a green card, is that correct?" That is an
 9
    example of questions that should be precluded in this
10
    case.
11
               THE COURT: All right, thank you.
12
               Mr. Greene, do you have anything you want to
13
    add on this issue?
14
                           No, sir. As I've said before,
               MR. GREENE:
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    I feel as though I'm at a disadvantage. So to try to
16
    preclude or ask anything -- I don't want to overstep my
17
    bounds. So at this time, I'll just take in the
18
    information but right now, I have no questions here.
19
               THE COURT: Okay, thank you, sir. I
20
    appreciate that.
21
               MR. GREENE: Thank you.
22
               THE COURT:
                           I'm going to take one minute to
23
    just check something. I'll be right back and then I
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    think I'm going to be in a position to rule on this, so
25
    stand by.
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(Tape off, tape on.) 1 2 THE COURT: I've read all the papers, I've listened to counsel's arguments, all of which were very 3 well done, and I'm prepared to issue a ruling on this 4 5 question. Before the undersigned is an application by 6 7 plaintiffs for a protective order "prohibiting the 8 County of Suffolk and other defendants from questioning 9 plaintiffs or other protected individuals on matters related to immigration status." That's DE-91 on page 10 11 1. 12 This issue apparently crystalized during the 13 deposition of one of the plaintiffs on January 12, 14 2017. After a handful of questions, counsel for the 15 County asked the witness, "How long have you lived in 16 the United States?" That's DE-83-1 at page 10. 17 Counsel for plaintiffs interposed an 18 objection and instructed the witness not to answer. 19 The situation quickly devolved -- a word I do not use 20 in a pejorative sense, just an observational sense, but 21 it devolved into a debate among counsel about the 22 propriety of inquiring into the immigration status of 23 the witness or asking any question that could 2.4 potentially bear on that issue. If anyone wants to 25 read that, it's at pages 10 to 24 of the deposition.

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Rather than seek a telephonic ruling, counsel opted to suspend the deposition and perhaps further depositions in the case and file motion papers with the Court, which was I believe a wise decision given the complexity of these issues. Plaintiffs filed the instant motion on May 3<sup>rd</sup> and the County filed its response on May 8th. Argument was held today and counsel again did a fine job presenting this. background of this matter is set forth in detail in Judge Spatt's order dated October 14th, 2015, familiarity with which is assumed and which is incorporated by reference herein. If anyone wants to look that up, that's at DE-36. To discuss this a little bit more, plaintiffs' primary argument in support of its motion centers on the notion that immigration status is irrelevant to the claims and defense in this action, rendering such inquiry "inappropriate." That also can be found in DE-82. Counsel for plaintiffs argued more specifically that, "County defendants' counsel fundamentally misunderstands plaintiffs' complaint, which makes clear that plaintiffs were victims of unconstitutional discrimination and discriminatory police action based on defendants' perceptions, however

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flawed, regarding plaintiffs' Latino heritage, not their immigration status. Members of the class were discriminated against because they are Latino, not because of their immigration status. Whether the plaintiffs are U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents or presently seeking a change in their immigration status is irrelevant to whether they were the target of discriminatory police action because of their Latino heritage or any discriminatory assumptions and perceptions made by police about their Latino heritage." That's DE-82 on page 1. Indeed, if the allegations of the complaint were so limited, plaintiffs' point would be well-taken. In other words, had the complaint focused on the targeting of plaintiffs and others as potential robbery victims based solely upon the belief that they were undocumented workers -- I apologize, that's incorrect -- based on a belief that they were Latino and solely on that belief, then the question of their actual immigration status would likely be irrelevant. complaint by way of example at paragraph 78. "Defendant Greene and various John Doe defendants, SCPD officers, had a practice and pattern of targeting Latino drivers for unlawful stops and searches, during which cash was stolen. Suffolk County

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Latinos were specifically targeted based on the belief that these drivers were likely to be undocumented and therefore prone both to carry cash and not to report any theft." Again, that's from the complaint. However, as plaintiffs' counsel observed during the suspended deposition that catalyzed this dispute, this complaint extends past Officer Greene. It extends well beyond Greene, and that's DE-83-1 at Indeed, a review of the complaint and First Amendment complaint tends to undercut the characterization of the allegations proffered by plaintiffs' counsel on this motion. I would note that in an effort to buttress their characterization, counsel cites Judge Spatt's discussion of the allegations in an opinion authorizing plaintiffs to proceed anonymously, which is found at DE-82 at 1. However, in that decision, Judge Spatt provided only a "brief overview of the serious allegations contained in the plaintiffs' 62-page complaint." That's DE-36 at 3, which summary obviously focused on those allegations which heightened the perceived risks of retaliation that warranted granting permission to proceed anonymously. The complaint alleges that in 2007, the County adopted a "policy to arrest all unlicensed

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drivers," which it alleged "led to the aggressive
pursuit and stopping without cause of undocumented
Latino immigrants driving on Suffolk County roads."
That's DE-21 paragraph 139.
          More specifically, it alleged that, "In
April, 2007, then Suffolk Assistant Chief of Patrol
Robert Ponzo sent an email to the SCPD commanders
stating that, "Starting immediately, any person
operating a motor vehicle who is not licensed will be
summarily arrested if he or she had no other form of
identification." That's from paragraph 138.
           According to the complaint, in 2009, a PBA
official, "publicly stated that he believed this 2007
directive to arrest all unlicensed drivers led to the
aggressive pursuit and stopping without cause of
undocumented Latino immigrants driving on Suffolk
County roads." That's paragraph 141 which I cited
earlier during the argument.
           The complaint claims that the 2007 "policy,
which was enacted as a means to target and harass
undocumented Latinos in Suffolk County, is still in
effect today." Again, paragraph 142.
           In describing the constitutional violations
complained of, the amended complaint charges -- and
this is a quote from the complaint: "Defendants'
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constitutional violations were and are directly and 1 2 proximately caused by policies, practices and/or customs enforced, encouraged and sanctioned by the SCPD 3 and Suffolk County, including A) SCPD Commissioner 4 5 Richard Dormer's 2007 order to officers to arrest any 6 person operating a motor vehicle who is not licensed if they are unable to offer another form of identification, and Commissioner 8 9 Weber's refusal to rescind such a policy currently in 10 use today." That's from paragraph 169 and you can also 11 see paragraph 192, which says the same thing. 12 Because the complaint specifically alleges 13 that the 2007 policy affected plaintiffs and potential 14 class members lacking documentation, these allegations 15 are difficult to reconcile with the arguments posited 16 by plaintiffs' counsel on this motion. For avoidance 17 of doubt, the issue of whether these claims are 18 actionable is not before the undersigned and nothing in 19 this ruling should be so construed. 20 While plaintiffs' counsel has not 21 articulated this position, it could be argued that, 22 notwithstanding their heft, the allegations constitute 23 contextual surplusage. However, the first amended 2.4 complaint also contains the following demand on page 61 25 in its prayer for relief, which seeks "the appointment

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and authorization of a special master or monitor to assess the eligibility of class members for U visas certifications based upon whether they have been helpful, are being helpful or are likely to be helpful in the investigation or prosecution of qualifying criminal activity and endorse United States Citizenship and immigration Services form 1-918 supplement B U nonimmigrant status certification regarding the same." This demand appears relevant only to those plaintiffs and potential class members who require a change to their immigration status. As such, the demand for U visas appears to dovetail with the argument made by the County to suggest that inquiry into immigration status are relevant to its defense given the facts of this case. Specifically, the County argues, among other things, that it "seeks to establish through discovery that there are different, if not many, subclasses of Latinos in Suffolk County: 1) citizens, 2) naturalized citizens, 3) lawful permanent residents, 4) work authorization or other lawful status, and/or 5) undocumented immigrants. The County will show that plaintiffs' proposed class is over-broad, that all Suffolk County Latinos are not similarly situated and that not all Latinos residing in Suffolk County are at

risk of discriminatory practices." That's DE-95 at 4. 1 2 Thus, it would seem that the County requires 3 the information sought to formulate an argument as to the breadth and scope of the proposed class and 4 5 ascertain whether the named plaintiffs are suitable 6 representatives of said class or, if they exist, other subclasses. Clearly, in light of the allegations made in and the relief sought by the First Amendment 9 complaint, inquiry into immigration status does seem 10 reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 11 12 At the same time, counsel for plaintiffs 13 correctly notes that there is a substantial body of 14 case law recognizing the "chilling effect" of such 15 inquiries. You can see DE-91 but among other things, 16 there was a cite to Judge Pollack's decision in Flores 17 v. Amigon as well as Judge Knaff's (ph) decision in Lu 18 v. Donna Karen International, et cetera, and I won't 19 burden the record with quotes from those cases but 20 suffice it to say, they are persuasive on the question 21 of chilling effect. 22 In response to these cases, the County 2.3 points to the substantial accommodations already in 2.4 place which would help mitigate these effects, 25 including the extant confidentiality order and

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subsequent agreement to seal the deposition transcripts. See DE-95 at 4, where those matters are discussed, as well as DE-36, which was the order of the district court permitting plaintiffs to proceed anonymously. These steps certainly will help allay the concerns raised. I have to add that counsel for plaintiffs acknowledged during argument today that at some point, given the U visa requests and so forth, the issue of plaintiffs' status must be explored in connection with the prayer for relief. I believe, however, this may need to be explored prior to the class certification phase of the case, so balancing these issues is quite complicated. Fortunately, the rules empower this Court to take additional steps to minimize the burden and expense imposed by the discovery process on any particular party. Here I cite Crawford-El v. Britain, 118 S.C. 1584, where the Supreme Court of the United States told us, "The court may limit the time, place and manner of discovery or even bar discovery altogether on certain subjects as required to protect a part or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense." They're citing Rule 26(c). They go on to say, "And the court may also

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set the timing and sequence of discovery," again citing
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    26(d). And that's the end of the Supreme Court's
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    quote.
               Pursuant to this authority, this Court
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    hereby adopts the following procedure for this case:
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    Prior to the recommencement of depositions, or if they
    have recommenced, prior to additional depositions,
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    counsel for plaintiffs shall provide counsel for
 9
    defendants with a list identifying the immigration
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    status of each plaintiff or other witness to be
11
    deposed, accompanied by documents supporting the claims
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    of those reporting legal status. Where appropriate, of
13
    course, counsel may also indicate that one or more
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    individuals will invoke a privilege against self-
15
    incrimination, which they may well be entitled to do.
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               Said list will have the same effect as an
17
    interrogatory response or a response to a request for
18
    admission and will be subject to the confidentiality
19
    orders and agreements currently in place. By providing
20
    this information in a less adversarial setting, this
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    procedure will hopefully help further minimize the
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    "chilling effect" identified by plaintiffs' counsel and
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    hopefully avoid further delays in conducting
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    depositions in this matter.
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Obviously, I cannot anticipate every

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question that may arise. I will leave it to counsel's good judgment to try to implement the principles that I'm setting forth today. The Court is of course always available to resolve further disputes as they crystalize. Based on that ruling, I am going to grant in part and deny in part the protective order, granted only to the extent set forth herein, which would be the additional procedural protections that I've set forth today. With that out of the way, are there other matters we should discuss while we're here today? MS. BRENNAN: I think with respect to defendant Greene, your Honor, while we're all in the room and defendant Greene is on the line, there are just two housekeeping matters there. Defendant Greene, this is Mallory Brennan from Shearman & Sterling. I represent the plaintiff in this case. You either have already received or should receive shortly acknowledgments to be -- that you should sign if you'd like to receive the confidential materials in this case. That's pursuant to Judge Brown's order that was issued last month. Those were mailed to you. I don't think we have a return mail receipt but they should be there. So if you can sign

and return those, we will include the deposition

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transcripts and the plaintiffs' names together with --
I believe you had also requested a full set of the
docket. That's something that plaintiffs would be
willing to undertake and prepare for you, so we will
send all of that together, assuming that meets with the
Court's approval.
           THE COURT:
                      That's fine with me.
          Mr. Greene, do you have those
acknowledgments? Do you know what counsel is referring
to?
          MR. GREENE: I did receive something the
other day, your Honor. I believe it's in fact what Ms.
Brennan is talking about. There is some confusion in
reading them. I hate to be signing something and then
limiting myself from that point forward if let's say
another situation was to arise. So without being able
to get a clear and precise interpretation of what those
documents actually say -- I'm doing my best to try to I
quess translate them via the law library at the
location I'm at. But at the current time, I can't say
that I will sign them or I won't. I'm still trying to
figure out exactly what my limitations are once I do
sign them.
           THE COURT: Okay, so here's the thing.
now have an explanation as to why he didn't get the
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documents. That's fine.
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               Basically, if you want the documents that
    are subject to the confidentiality order, you have to
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    make yourself subject to that order and I imagine that
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    that's what the acknowledgment suggests.
 6
               MR. GREENE:
                            Right.
 7
               THE COURT: But understand I haven't seen
 8
    them so I don't know what they say, so do your best to
    get through them.
 9
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               MR. GREENE: Okay.
11
               THE COURT: And if you want the material,
12
    you need to sign it. If not, we can revisit that at
13
    some later point, all right?
14
               MR. GREENE: Okay, very good.
15
               THE COURT: Anything else?
16
               MS. BRENNAN: In light of the Court's order
17
    today, we have an existing discovery cutoff deadline of
18
    July 7<sup>th</sup>. We will be putting --
19
               THE COURT: Wow, you're going to have a busy
20
    weekend.
21
               MS. BRENNAN: Busy 4th of July, I know.
22
    was conferring with Ms. Lopez earlier. We will put
23
    together a proposed revised schedule that makes sense,
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    so we'll be submitting that, but we won't take up your
25
    time negotiating that right now.
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               THE COURT: Lest anyone not sleep this
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    weekend, I will extend the -- I will give you some
 3
    reasonable extension.
               MS. BRENNAN: Thank you very much.
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               THE COURT: Anything else for the County?
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               MS. LOPEZ: No, your Honor, thank you.
 7
               THE COURT: Mr. Greene, while we have you,
    anything else for you, sir?
8
9
               MR. GREENE: No, sir, thank you.
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               THE COURT: Everyone had a good holiday
11
    weekend. We are adjourned. Thank you.
12
               MS. BRENNAN: Thank you, your Honor.
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          I certify that the foregoing is a correct
    transcript from the electronic sound recording of the
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    proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
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                                             August 15, 2017
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    ELIZABETH BARRON
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